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STATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY AFTER
BENTON v. MARYLAND
In 1965, John Dalmer Benton was tried for burglary and larceny in
a Maryland state court. Although acquitted on the larceny charge, he
was convicted on the burglary count and sentenced to ten years in
prison. While his appeal was pending, the Maryland Court of Appeals
struck down that portion of the Maryland Constitution which required
jurors to swear their belief in the existence of God.' Due to the fact that
both Benton's grand and petit juries had been chosen under this invalid
provision, he was given the option of accepting his confinement or seek-
ing reindictment and retrial. He chose the latter, and, upon retrial on
both charges, was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment
for burglary and five years for larceny, the sentences running concur-
rently.2
At his second trial, Bentcn had objected to the retrial of the larceny
charge, claiming that as he had been acquitted at the first trial, a retrial
would violate the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution.' The Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals rejected this claim on the merits, and the court of appeals denied
discretionary review.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on two
issues:4
(1) Is the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment
applicable to the State through the Fourteenth Amendment?
(2) If so, was the petitioner "twice put in jeopardy" in this
case?5
The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. It
held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, and overruled its 1937
landmark decision to the contrary in Palko v. Connecticut.6
In Palko, the defendant had been indicted for first degree murder in
1. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
2. The concurrent sentence issue, disposed of in the first one-half of the Court's
opinion thus enabling a decision on the double jeopardy issue, is omitted from the
discussion of this case.
3. "(N)or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put injeopardy of life and limb; . . ."
4. 392 U.S. 925 (1968).
5. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 786 (1969).
6. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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a Connecticut state court and convicted of second degree murder. Pur-
suant to a state statute which permitted an appeal of this nature, the
State appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors which reversed the
judgment and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, the defendant
argued that his retrial violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment, and that the fifth amendment should be applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The
trial court overruled the defendant's objections, convicted him of first
degree murder, and sentenced him to death. Affirming the conviction,
the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's contentions, denied the in-
clusion argument, and substituted in its stead a due process standard:
Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has sub-
jected him a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will
not endure it? Does it violate those "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civilized political
institutions"? 7
Palko allowed the states to develop their own individual doctrines to
determine the extent to which each would allow a defendant to be placed
in "double joepardy", subject only to the "fundamental fairness" test
which the Supreme Court had enunciated. This approach led to a
confusing multiplicity of answers to double jeopardy questions and made
uniformity of decision throughout the states all but impossible of attain-
ment. As a result of the Court's decision in Benton, it is now clear that
the obstructions on the road to the imposition of federal double jeopardy
standards upon the states have been swept away:
Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice", the same con-
stitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Gov-
ernments. . . . The validity of petitioner's larceny conviction
must be judged not by the watered-down standards enunciated in
Palko, but under this Court's interpretations of the Fifth Amend-
ment double jeopardy provisions. 8
Because of the decision in Benton, it seems timely at this point to
review the federal law as to double jeopardy, with a particular view to
noting changes which the federal standards will necessitate in state law.
Because of the diverse nature of the federal double jeopardy law, it
will be necessary in order to avoid confusion and to facilitate effective
analysis, to divide the area into categories.
Although the instances of overlap are plentiful, most double jeopardy
7. Id. at 328.
8. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969).
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cases tend to fall into one of five categories:9
(1) The trial may be stopped short of its final termination point,
in which case, the question arises as to whether or not the defendant has
undergone a sufficient risk to justify attachment of the defense.
(2) The trial may end in an acquittal, and the prosecution may at-
tempt to subject the defendant to retrial on another indictment.
(3) The trial may end with a conviction, later reversed, with the
defendant on subsequent retrial convicted of a greater offense than he
had been originally.
(4) Overlapping jurisdictional boundaries may result in a second
trial for the same offense merely because both jurisdictions have the
power to proscribe and punish such conduct.
(5) Finally, one act may violate several criminal statutes or injure
several persons, giving rise to the question whether each statute vio-
lated or each person injured represents a criminally punishable act.
ATTACHMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Although there is some doubt as to when it finally became settled in
the federal courts, the bar of double jeopardy has been held not to refer
exclusively to a prior conviction or acquittal.' 0 As a result, when a
trial is stopped at some point short of its final termination, the plea of
double jeopardy is not automatically foreclosed, and the question be-
comes whether the defense has attached, and perhaps more significantly,
is not barred by the application of an exception.
In the federal courts, it is generally agreed that jeopardy attaches
when the jury has been impaneled and sworn, and that, in the absence
of a jury, jeopardy does not attach until the production of evidence has
begun." Prior to this point the defendant is not deemed to have suf-
fered a sufficient risk to constitute jeopardy, and if the prosecution is
stopped for some reason, it is as if it had never begun. Termination of
proceedings after this mark has been passed provides the defendant with
a valid former jeopardy plea upon retrial on another indictment for the
same offense, unless some exception is applicable.
Recognizing that in some instances a trial should be allowed to
terminate without affording the defendant the benefit of a former
9. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY 40 (1969).
10. Compare Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 S. & R 577 (1822), with United
States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207 (No. 15,321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
11. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
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jeopardy defense on retrial, the federal courts have developed a series of
exceptions to the attachment situation. Such instances, subsumed un-
der the heading "manifest necessity", include a mistrial because the
jury is unable to agree,' 2 discovery that a member of the jury is
biased,'" the sudden illness of a juror, 14 irregularity of the indictment, 15
and the absence of witnesses because of military reasons,'8 among
others.
While many of these exceptions may be justified on the ground that
they are the unavoidable accidents of life for which the state should not
be penalized, nor the defendant unduly benefitted, other instances
of the operation of the "manifest necessity" doctrine present other justifi-
cations. Thus, in Gori v. United States,'7 the defendant was brought to
trial on an indictment charging that he knowingly received and possessed
goods stolen in interstate commerce. After the jury had been im-
paneled and sworn, the trial judge withdrew a juror and declared a
mistrial on his own motion in order to protect the defendant from the
prosecution's attempted disclosure of prejudicial information. Upon re-
trial, the defendant was convicted, and this conviction was upheld by
the Supreme Court:
Suffice that we are unwilling, where it clearly appears that a
mistrial has been granted in the sole interest of the defendant, to
hold that its necessary consequence is to bar all retrial.' 8
Thus it appears, that in addition to those recognized situations where a
defendant may be retried after jeopardy has formally attached, the same
result will follow if, for some other reason, the trial is prematurely
terminated for the sole benefit of the defendant.
The pattern among the states regarding the attachment of jeopardy
has been varied and infinitely more confusing than the federal courts.
Although the general rule has been much like that of its federal
counterpart, in that jeopardy can be said to attach after a jury has
been impaneled and sworn, a canvass of the states provides examples
of other views.' 9  However, with the advent of Benton, it is obvious
12. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 379 (1824).
13. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894).
14. United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941).
15. Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916).
16. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
17. 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
18. Id. at 369.
19. Some states have required, as is the English rule, that jeopardy attach only to a
final judgment of acquittal or conviction. Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 425 (1863).
Others have found attachment only upon an acquittal. Smith v. State, 158 Miss. 355,
128 So. 891 (1930). Even others, notably New York, have required that evidence
must have been introduced against the defendant. People v. Zendano, 136 N.Y.S.2d
1970
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that such substantive variations must at least comply with the require-
ments of the fifth amendment.
The state court exceptions to the attachment of jeopardy have in-
cluded those mentioned in connection with the federal cases as well as
others peculiar to their own jurisdictions. -0  While some attempts have
been made to codify in statutory form some of these exceptions, 21 it has
generally been recognized to be in the discretion of the trial judge to
determine when a "manifest necessity", sufficient to terminate the pro-
ceedings, exists. This situation derived from the Supreme Court's
application of the Palko doctrine upholding retrial even in cases where
the federal law as to double jeopardy would have been contrary.
Thus, in Brock v. North Carolina,22 the trial judge declared a mistrial
on the motion of the prosecution after two of the state's witnesses re-
fused to give any testimony before the jury.2 The defendant was later
convicted of the same offense in a second trial and his plea of double
jeopardy overruled. Applying the principles of due process enunciated
in Palko, the Supreme Court held that the defendant could be pre-
sented for trial before a second jury for the same offense, without vio-
lating the fourteenth amendment.24
With the advent of Benton, and the concurrent demise of Palko, this
constitutional base was swept away. The mandate of the Court directs
that state conduct violative of fifth amendment standards of double
jeopardy must cease. Therefore, at a minimum, state courts must now
recognize the attachment of the double jeopardy defense in those situ-
ations in which the federal courts have held the defense available.
Thus, it is possible that Brock would be decided differently today be-
cause it fails to fit within a recognized exception, and the trial was not
terminated for the sole benefit of the defendant.
106 (1954). Yet some have found attachment with the charging of the jury. State
v. Crook, 16 Utah 212, 51 P. 1091 (1898). Some have used commencement of trial.
Gillespie v. State, 168 Ind. 298, 180 N.E. 829 (1907). Some have found attachment
also on the sustaining of a demurrer to an indictment. State v. Reinhard, 202 Iowa 168,
209 N.W. 419 (1926).
20. See United States v. Perez, supra note 12.
21. MIssIssIPPI CODE, 1930, § 1289.
22. 344 U.S. 424 (1952).
23. These witnesses refused to testify on advice of counsel as their appeals were
pending from a former prosecution involving the same crime.
24. "This Court has long favored the rule of discretion in the trial judge to de-
clare a mistrial and to require another panel to try the defendant if the ends of justice
will be best served. (Citations omitted). As said in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690,
'a trial can be discontinued when particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so
doing, and when failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice.' Justice to
either or both parties may indicate to the wise discretion of the trial judge that he
declare a mistrial and require the defendant to stand trial before another jury. As in
102
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TRIAL AFTER ACQUITTAL
When an accused is indicted and tried for an offense, and subse-
quently acquitted on that charge, it is beyond dispute that if the prose-
cution begins another trial upon another indictment for the same of-
fense, the plea of double jeopardy will afford a valid defense so long as
the first court had jurisdiction and the proceedings were regular in every
way:
Where a man is found not guilty, on an indictment or appeal,
free from error, and well commenced before any court which hath
jurisdiction of the cause, he may, by the common law, in all cases,
plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent indictment or appeal
for the same crime. 25
While this has been the rule in both the federal and the state courts, the
Palko case allowed the state to appeal after an acquittal and, if re-
versible error was found, retry the defendant as long as this procedure
was permitted by state law. Although not relevant to a decision there,
the Court in Palko cited Kepner v. United States" as representing the
controlling federal position:
The view was there expressed for a majority of the court that
the prohibition was not confined to jeopardy in a new and indepen-
dent case. It forbade jeopardy in the same case if the new trial
was at the instance of the government and not upon defendant's
motion.2 7
Now that Palko has been overruled, the Benton decision would seem to
prohibit appeal of a criminal case by the state after an acquittal on the
merits. Furthermore, because of the "lesser included offense" doctrine,
under which a person can be convicted of any lesser offenses included
in the offense for which he was indicted, 2 an outright acquittal will
also bar retrial on these lesser offenses. Moreover, if the lesser offense
is tried first, this will also be a bar to a subsequent indictment on the
greater charge.29
all cases involving what is or is not due process, so in this case, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down. The pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and circum-
stances of each case. The pattern here, long in use in North Carolina, does not
deny the fundamental essentials of a trial, 'the very essence of a scheme of ordered
justice', which is due process." Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427 (1952).
25. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126 (1904).
26. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
27. 302 U.S. at 322-23.
28. Re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
29. Some federal courts have apparently applied this test. Goodall v. United
States, 180 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Although there is a split, over one-half of the
states which have considered the question have adopted it. See Frankfurter, J. in
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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RETRIAL AFTER SUCCESSFUL APPEAL By DEFENDANT
When a trial ends with a conviction, and the defendant successfully
appeals, the prosecution may attempt to convict him of a greater offense
than he was originally indicted for, or to convict him of the same of-
fense as well as others not contained in the original indictment. This
raises the question of what limitations may be placed upon a reindict-
ment and retrial.
It was established at an early date that if the defendant appealed his
first conviction, he had waived any objection to a retrial on the charge
for which he was convicted.30 Whether justified on the grounds of
waiver or a continuing jeopardy theory,' this result has been con-
sistently reached by the federal courts. Some courts, however, sought
to apply the "waiver rule" to authorize a retrial for a greater crime than
that for which the defendant was convicted in the first trial.32 Although
that was the rule in the federal courts for some time,33 the case of Green
v. United States34 states the modem federal position.
In Green, the defendant was found guilty of second degree murder
upon a first degree murder charge; the jury making no mention of the
higher charge. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial upon defendant's appeal. On retrial, Green was tried
once again for first degree murder, his plea of double jeopardy being
overruled, and he was convicted of this crime and sentenced to death.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Rejecting the Government's conten-
tion that the defendant had waived his double jeopardy defense by ap-
pealing his first conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision. The Court recognized that after his original conviction,
prior to appeal, Green could not have been retried for the greater of-
fense, and that, if his appeal had been unsuccessful, he still could not
have been tried a second time. Characterizing the jury's silence as an
implied acquittal of the higher charge, the Court concluded that con-
ditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid
30. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
3 1. Justice Holmes attempted to justify the same result on different grounds. Ac-
cording to him, the defendant was under a continuing jeopardy until his cause was
finally settled. See Holmes, J. in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (dis-
senting opinion).
32. There is a wide divergence of opinion among the states. Some states have
permitted retrial on crimes of a higher degree. Jones v. State, 144 Miss. 52, 109 So.
265 (1926). Some have prohibited such a procedure. State v. Naylor, 28 Del. 99, 90
A. 880 (1914). Others have held that retrial is barred on a higher degree of the
"same offense". Barnett v. People, 54 Ill. 325 (1870).
33. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
34. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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plea of former jeopardy on another, conflicted with the constitutional
bar against double jeopardy. Thus today under Benton, it is clear
that, in both the state and the federal courts, the "waiver rule" may
not be used to retry a defendant on a greater charge than he was con-
victed of originally. Nor can the "waiver rule" be used to justify on the
retrial, additional counts barred under the "lesser included offense"
doctrine.
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES
Overlapping jurisdictional boundaries, particularly those of the states
and the federal government, have produced a situation in which a crim-
inal defendant can be tried and punished by both jurisdictions for one
criminal act.3 5 The much criticized leading case of United States v.
Lanza 3 6 set the precedent for this result. The defendant in Lanza was
indicted in a federal court for violation of the federal prohibition law
after a state proceeding for violation of a state law of a similar nature
had terminated. Overruling Lanza's double jeopardy plea, the Su-
preme Court squarely held that the fifth amendment did not prohibit
consecutive prosecutions by state and federal governments. The
Court bottomed its decision on the dual sovereignty concept of federal-
ism, holding that each separate government retained the power to prose-
cute and punish conduct violative of the laws of each without the inter-
ference of the other. The fifth amendment double jeopardy provision
applied only to successive federal prosecutions while the Palko doctrine
applied to successive trials by the same state. While the fact situation
in Lanza involved a federal prosecution following a completed state
proceeding, the Court, in Bartkus v. lllinois3T reached the same con-
clusion when faced with the problem of a state prosecution following a
federal acquittal.
In addition to the dual sovereignty concept of federalism, each Court
was also apparently troubled with the possibility that a conviction or
acquittal of some relatively minor offense in one jurisdiction would bar
prosecution for a greater offense in the other:
Were the federal prosecution of a comparatively minor offense to
prevent state prosecution of so grave and infraction of state law, the
result would be shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic
35. There is also a problem between the states and the municipalities residing
within their borders which has usually been settled by denominating the municipal or-
dinances as not penal in nature and thereby avoiding the conflict. A discussion has
been omitted.
36. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
37. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
105
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right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and order
within their confines. . . . It would be in derogation of our
federal system to displace the reserved power of States over state
offenses by reason of prosecution of minor federal offenses by
federal authorities beyond the control of the States.38
Thus, the Court's decisions in this area are supported by the concept
that federalism, or respect for the sovereignty of each jurisdiction, re-
quires these results, and by judicial recognition of the possibility that
conviction of criminal defendants on minor charges might foreclose
prosecutions carrying substantially greater sentences.
In light of Benton, it would seem that the justification for the Lanza
and Bartkus line of cases has been somewhat weakened. While ad-
mittedly the Supreme Court did not address itself to the constitutional
issues raised by Lanza and Bartkus, the overruling of the Palko de-
cision is significant as the most recent example of the Supreme Court's
position on the dual sovereignty concept of federalism. As such, it is
appropriate to examine the Lanza and Bartkus rationale in order to deter-
mine whether it still is compatible with the current trend of the Su-
preme Court's decisions in this area.
The most significant case, in terms of its impact on the Lanza and
Bartkus rationale, is the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Water-
front Commission," which applied the holding of Malloy v. Hogan4"
to the effect that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is fully applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
The question in Murphy was whether one jurisdiction in the federal
structure could constitutionally compel testimony by granting immun-
ity to a witness while leaving the witness open to prosecution in the
other jurisdiction on the basis of that testimony. The Court answered
this question in the negative:
We hold that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation protects a state witness against incrimination under federal
as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination
under state as well as federal law.41
The Murphy court took judicial notice of the fact that this is an "age
of cooperative federalism" and that the federal and state governments
are not antagonistic toward each other but are in fact "waging a united
front against many types of criminal activity. '4'  Thus, the Court cast
38. Id. at 137.
39. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
40. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
41. 378 U.S. at 78.
42. Id. at 56.
Vol. 1: -9 8
State Double Jeopardy
doubt upon the continuing vitality of the concept that either a state or
the federal government could retry, for the same offense, a defendant
once placed in jeopardy by the other.
The evil in Murphy was that one jurisdiction could prosecute a defend-
ant based on information received from another's grant of immunity.
Just as this danger resulted in Murphy from grants of immunity, it may
also be present in double jeopardy cases. One jurisdiction can stay its
prosecution while the other trys the defendant. Should the first trial
end in an acquittal, the second jurisdiction can then benefit by an error
made in the first trial and more easily secure a conviction. Further-
more, the results in Murphy indicate that even if state and federal cooper-
ation were not the case, this possibility would still not be sufficient to
protect the defendant's interests. 43
Thus, just as Murphy would allow state action to impede federal
law enforcement by rendering broad areas of relevant information inad-
missible, so too the state prosecution of a defendant for a state crime
should prevent a like prosecution by the federal government and vice
versa. In view of the Court's decision in Murphy which followed from
the holding in Malloy that the full fifth amendment self-incrimination
protections applied to the states, it does not seem totally inaccurate to
suggest that the Benton decision, making the double jeopardy protec-
tions equally applicable, places the Lanza and Bartkus line of de-
cisions upon shaky ground.44
MULTIPLE OFFENSES AND MULTIPLE INJURIES
Perhaps the issue of double jeopardy law which causes the most
confusion occurs when the defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of
more than one criminal statute. Closely related to this is the situation in
which the defendant's one criminal act injures more than one person
or piece of property. In fact, so closely related are these two problems
that the courts, both federal and state, had adopted the same series of
tests to determine whether a subsequent prosecution is prohibited.
The "same transaction" test prohibits the reprosecution of the defend-
ant for any occurrence arising out of the same criminal transaction4 5
and is a favorable test for the defendant, as it allows a second prose-
cution only when the proof indicates that the second case does not con-
43. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
44. The case of Waller v. Florida, 213 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1968), cert. granted, 37
U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. June 23, 1969) (No. 846) may be significant.
45. Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1930); Tritico v. United States,
4 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1925).
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cern the same criminal acts as the first. Most courts, however, have
held that the fact that two charges, which are defined by separate stat-
utes, relate to and grow out of one transaction, does not make a single
offense, and prosecution on both charges does not constitute double
jeopardy.46 These courts usually apply one or the other of the follow-
ing two tests to resolve the question.
Some of these courts apply the "same offense" test, holding that
where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two dis-
tinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not.47 Thus, where it is necessary
in proving one offense to prove every essential element of another, a
conviction of the former is a bar to prosecution for the latter. Still
other courts hold that for double jeopardy purposes, the test of identity
of charges is whether the "same evidence" is required to sustain them.
If additional evidence is required, the fact that several charges relate to
and grow out of one transaction or occurrence does not make it the
same act.48 The distinction between these two tests is probably a
nebulous one, for, they seem to produce the same results in practice.
Thus, while the "same offense" test requires proof of an additional fact
over and above that required for the first offense, invariably new evidence
will be introduced to prove that fact.49
The fact situation in Gore v. United States50 may be utilized to
illustrate the difference between the first and the latter two tests.
There the defendant was prosecuted for narcotics offenses under an
indictment of six counts, three for each of two separate sales of heroin.
The first count charged a sale not in pursuance of a written order, the
second, a sale not in the original stamped package, and the third charged
facilitating concealment and sale of drugs unlawfully imported. The
defendant was convicted, and sentences of one to five years imposed for
each count, the first three running consecutively, and the remaining
46. Young v. United States, 288 F.2d 398, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 414, cert. denied,
372 U.S. 919 (1963).
47. Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871); State v. Pianfetti, 79 Vt. 236,
65 A. 84 (1906). This test appears to find its authority in the early case of Carter v.
McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1901).
48. Owsley v. Cunningham, 190 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Va. 1961); Montgomery v.
United States, 146 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1945).
49. This is at least the case when viewed as the evidence required to be submitted
at the first trial to prove the facts alleged. However, when looked upon as the evi-
dence actually introduced at the first trial, there may be some basis for the distinction.
While the courts have not been particularly lucid on this point, the former is apparently
the construction adopted.
50. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
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three concurrently. The defendant appealed the sentence, contending
that for each set of three counts only one sentence could be imposed.
This motion was denied, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.
Applying the "same offense" test, the Court determined that, with
respect to each sale, the petitioner had violated three separate and dis-
tinct statutes and could be validly tried and punished for each, stating:
The fact that an offender violates by a single transaction several
regulatory controls devised by Congress as a means for dealing
with a social evil as deleterious as it is difficult to combat does
not make the several different regulatory controls single and
identic. 51
Yet, if the "same transaction" test were applied, the result would be
different as all three of the counts relating to each sale were concerned
with one sale of narcotics or one separate and distinct criminal trans-
action. The test applied in the Gore decision and the rationale em-
ployed to reach that decision is, however, the latest ruling of the United
States Supreme Court and thus constitutes the federal rule, binding on
the lower federal courts. Prior to the decision in Benton, the due proc-
ess clause did not impose this test upon the state courts. Since that
decision, however, the state must comply with the double jeopardy
standards of the fifth amendment, and it seems clear that the varying
tests at the state level must comply with the minimum requirements of
this federal standard.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Benton v. Maryland, applying the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, will supply a unifying influence on state treat-
ment of double jeopardy problems. Variances will, nevertheless, con-
tinue to exist, at least where an individual state elects to afford protec-
tions which exceed those guaranteed by the applicable federal decisions.
On the whole, though, greater protections will be afforded to state
criminal defendants after Benton than was the case under the Palko doc-
trine.
Benton may also be significant in that it may foreshadow a re-examina-
tion by the Supreme Court of some of its past decisions interpreting the
provisions of the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause. The Lanza-
51. Id. at 389.
109
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Bartkus line of decisions seem particularly vulnerable in this respect.
In any event, it seems probable that in the future double jeopardy prob-
lems will be viewed by the Court with increasing awareness, and that this
is likely to result in greater protection for criminal defendants.
RIcHARD G. LARSEN
